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COMMENTS
THE SURVIVAL OF A JURISPRUDENTIAL ANOMALY:
THE DEAD MAN'S RULE IN WISCONSIN
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the early English common law, it was well settled by 1680
that parties and other persons interested in the outcome of a civil
lawsuit were disqualified from testifying on the basis of their interest
in the outcome of the litigation. By this time the modern system of
trial by jury and testimony by witnesses was well established. How-
ever, interested witnesses had not always been so disqualified. Medieval
English law knew a mode of trial quite separate and distinct from
modern trial by jury, that of "wager of law." Matters in issue were
tried by the party's own oath assisted by compurgators or oath helpers.
A person's oath was itself, therefore, a method of trial and not pri-
marily a witness qualification.' A party and his compurgators were not
disqualified from taking the oath by reason of any interest in the con-
troversy. As a matter of fact the compurgators generally had some
kind of interest in the outcome and in addition they were usually rela-
tives or friends of the party who called them. Nevertheless it was not
felt that there was any impropriety in such a person assisting with his
oath the cause of a party. The jury was not limited to the courtroom or
what it found there. It could go out and investigate for itself. This
fact was true even after the beginning of the modern jury trial system,
where the witness testified under an oath which became a method of
witness qualification rather than a method of trial itself. However,
once the point was reached where the jury stopped going out to investi-
gate for itself, leaving it to the witnesses to furnish the information
needed, the modern objection to interested testimony began to resolve
itself. The theory was that there was a strong likelihood of a party
perjuring himself in his own behalf; that since a party is naturally
prone toward perjury, an impossible burden would be imposed on the
jury in its attempt to determine the veracity of the testimony; that
since the jury could not look into the mind of the witness in order to
determine to what extent his interest was influencing his testimony,
it would be more prudential to exclude the testimony altogether by
making a party an incompetent witness.2 In the words of Sir Edward
Coke:
'2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §575 (3rd ed. 1940); 9 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENG-
LAW 194 (1926) ; Lectures on Particular Phases of the Law of Evidence, by
the Honorable John D. Wickhem, former Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice,
before the Dane County Bar Association, 80-81 (1939-40) (hereinafter cited
as WicicEim's LECTURES).
2 See WICKHEm'S LECTURES 81-83.
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Experience proves that men's consciences grow so large that the
respect of their private advantage rather induces men (and
chiefly those who have declining estates) to perjury.'
Coke's influence largely determined why the party disqualification
was later extended to all persons interested in the lawsuit.4 The settle-
ment of the American colonies resulted in the disqualification becoming
part of the common law in the United States.
So strongly embedded was this distrust of testimony by a person
interested in the outcome of a lawsuit that many years elapsed before
the struggle to change the rule finally succeeded. The abuses attending
the entire exclusion of interested testimony must have been tremendous,
though, of course, a statistical survey, shedding any light on how many
times honest claimants and defendants were deprived of their just due,
was never taken. 5 One of the most significant developments in Nine-
teenth century jurisprudence was the breaking down of the barriers,
first as to parties, and later as to other interested witnesses as well.
The rule was abolished first in England6 and then in the United States.
Michigan led the way in 18431 and New York and other states followed.
In every jurisdiction under our law, interest as a disqualification has
expressly been abolished." When reform was first proposed in New
York, the New York Commissioners on practice and pleading stated:
The rule appears to us to rest upon a principle altogether un-
sound; that is that the situation of the witness will tempt him to
perjury. The reason strikes at the foundation of human testi-
mony. The only just inquiry is this; whether the chances of
obtaining truth are greater from the admission or the exclusion
of the witness. Who that has any respect for the society in which
he lives can doubt, that upon this principle, the witness should
be admitted? The contrary rule implies that in the majority of
instances men are so corrupted by their interest, that they will
perjure themselves for it, and besides being corrupt, they will
be so adroit as to deceive the courts and the juries. This is con-
trary to all experience. In the great majority of instances wit-
nesses are honest, however much interested, and in most cases
of dishonesty, the falsehood of the testimony is detected and
deceives none. Absolutely to exclude an interested witness is
therefore as unsound in theory as it is inconsistent in practice
... It [the reforming statute] . . . sweeps away the numberless
nice and subtle distinctions in which the profession was wont
to luxuriate; disencumbers our jurisprudence of a heavy load
of useless decisions resting upon refinements not principles . . .
3 Slade's Case (1602) 4 Co. Rep. @ f. 95 a.
4 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 195.
5 See Bobbe, The Uncontradicted Testimony of an Interested Witness, 20
CORNELLL. Q. 33 (1934).
6 Evidence Act of 1843 (Lord Denman's Act), 6 & 7 Vict., C. 85.
7 MICH. REV. STAT. C. 102 §99 (1846).
s See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 1, §488 n. 2, where the statutes are collected.
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There have been few greater improvements in our judicial sys-
tem, than those which are effected by this valuable statuteY
Nevertheless while interest no longer remains a basis for complete
disqualification of the witness, it is still a factor which the trier of fact
considers in determining his credibility. 10 To this extent, at least, Coke's
admonition has'not been forgotten, although the stringency of his solu-
tion to the problem has been rejected in a more enlightened era in.
which the unjust results of total exclusion are apparent.
II. THE DEADMAN'S RULE AS THE LAST RELIC OF THE
DISQUALIFICATION BY INTEREST RULE
In practically every jurisdiction in the United States where a sta-
tute eliminating the common law disqualification by interest rule was
enacted, one exception has been retained which perpetuates the prin-
ciple of the discarded rule within a limited area. This exception pro-
hibits the testimony of a survivor as to a transaction with a deceased
person when it is offered against the latter's estate.'1 The purpose of
this rule, commonly referred to as the "deadman's rule" was expressed
by Mr. Justice Hammond of the West Virginia Supreme Court in the
often cited case of Owens v. Owens: 2
.. The law in the exception of the privilege to testify was in-
tended to prevent an undue advantage on the part of the living
over the dead, who cannot confront the survivor or give his ver-
sion of the affair, or expose the omission, mistakes or perhaps
the falsehoods of such survivor. The temptation to falsehood
and concealment in such cases is considered too great to allow
the surviving party to testify in his own behalf. Any other view
of this subject, I think, would place in great peril the estates of
the dead, and would in fact make them an easy prey for the dis-
honest and unscrupulous...
The purpose of this comment is not to deal with the scope of indi-
vidual statutes in various jurisdictions, since while they all appear to
retain a portion of the common law disqualification in force, in actuality
there is a great variance between the situations to which the exclusions
are applicable. They not only vary greatly in phraseology, but the
attitudes of courts differ as to whether they should be liberally or
strictly applied. The result is that the precedents in one jurisdiction
are of little value in another. Rather, this comment will deal with the
Wisconsin statutory exclusion, its rationale and some of its interpreta-
tions. The purpose here is to demonstrate first that the rationale under-
lying the exclusion of the testimony of an interested survivor in Wis-
9 FIRST REPORT OF NEWv YORK COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE & PLEADING 246(1848).10 See 3 WIGI OE, supra note 1, §966 n. 1 where the statutes are listed.
"1 See 2 WiGMORE, ibid, §488 n. 2 where the statutes are collected; and 5 JONES,
COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE §2222 et. seq. (1926).
12 14 W. VA. 88, 95 (1878).
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consin is unsound (as it is in every other jurisdiction) and second, that
even if the rationale of the exclusion were sound, it cannot be demon-
strated that the Wisconsin statute achieves its purpose of protecting
the estates of deceased persons against the possibility of perjured testi-
mony. On the contrary, not only it is likely that the estates of deceased
persons have been despoiled to the same degree were the statute non-
existent, but in addition, what despoilation that has been prevented by
operation of the statute has been offset by the disallowance of honest
claims.
III. THE WISCONSIN STATUTORY ExCLUSION
In 1858 Wisconsin eliminated by statute the disqualification by
interest rule of the common law.1 3 At the same time the first dead man's
statute was enacted.14 The original dead man's statute was an outright
retention of the common law disqualification within the area of a cer-
tain class of actions. It prohibited a party from testifying at all in an
action wherein the opposite party sued or defended as the executor or
administrator of a deceased's estate, or where he claimed as an assignee
of a deceased assignor or as a principal of a deceased agent. The dis-
qualification was based on the identity of the opposite party, not upon
what the survivor was attempting to testify to. This was apparently an
unsatisfactory exclusion however, for in 1868 the law was modified in
the direction of the modern law in Wisconsin. The prohibition was
broadened in the sense that it was extended to any type of action, but
limited in the sense that it applied only where the parties or other
interested persons attempted to testify to a transaction or communica-
tion with a deceased person.15 In 1901 the statute was refined further.
The disqualification was limited to situations where a person attempted
to testify to a transaction with a deceased in his own behalf or interest.'6
This allowed in testimony of an interested providing it was not directed
toward his own interest. In 1907, trustees, stockholders and officers of
a corporation testifying on its behalf were disqualified the same as
other persons.' 7 The statute had then assumed its modern substance
and exists substantially unchanged today.
No party or person in his own behalf or interest, and no person
from, through or under whom a party derives his interest or
title, shall be examined as a witness in respect to any communi-
cation by him personally with a deceased or insane person in any
civil action or proceeding, in which the opposite party derives
his title or sustains his liability to the cause of action from,
through or under such deceased or insane person is a party pro-
secuting or defending by guirdian, unless such opposite party
13 Wis. REv. STAT. C. 137, §50 (1858).
14 Wis. REv. STAT. c. 137, §51 (1858).
'5 Wis. Laws 1868, c. 176.
16 Wis. Laws 1901, c. 181, §1.
3- Wis. Laws 1907, c. 197.
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shall first, in his own behalf introduce testimony of himself or
some other person concerning such transaction or communica-
tion, and then only in respect to such transaction or communica-
tion to which such testimony relates. And no stockholder, officer
or trustee of a corporation, from, through or under whom a
party derives his or its interest or title shall be so examined as
aforesaid.' 8
A. The Rationale of the Wisconsin Statutory Exclusion
In Will of Repush,9 one of the three subscribing witnesses to an
alleged noncupative will was held incompetent to testify as to its execu-
tion by the Testatrix. The will failed, there being a lack of the requisite
number of witnesses. The witness was not allowed to testify because
if the will were proved he would have been the sole legatee. Said the
court:
The purpose of the statute is to prevent parties to a transaction
from obtaining an unfair advantage over another party who
has since died. The lips of one being sealed by death, the lips of
the other are sealed by a rule of law which, though arbitrary is
made necessary to prevent greed and avarice from enabling the
survivor to perpetrate a fraud. Occasionally this works a hard-
ship. Revocation of relaxation of the rule would open the door
to fraud and work more and greater hardships. The deceased is
entitled to be protected against misquotation of his own words
as well as the purported statements of the witness' words to
him during his lifetime.
2 0
Repush indicates that there are two reasons why the testimony of
an interested survivor is excluded. The first is that since he is inter-
ested, he is untrustworthy. The second is that since the deceased is
unable to rebut or modify the survivor's testimony, in fairness to the
deceased and his estate the survivor's lips should also be closed. Insofar
as the disqualification is based on interest it is open to the same objec-
tions that were successfully levelled against the interest rule in general
at common law, namely, that in the majority of instances men are not
so corrupt that they will perjure themselves for their own interests and
that insofar as the witness would testify truthfully, exclusion is an
intolerable injustice. Therefore if the exclusion has a valid raison d'
etre, it would have to be the fairness proposition. Insofar as the exclu-
sion is based on fairness, it presumes that a perjurer will be so adroit
as to successfully run the gamut of cross-examination and deceive the
court or jury. This is questionable. Moreover, the deceased opponent,
who if he were alive would be a party, would also be a potential liar
equally with the disqualified survivor. The fairness proposition appears
to rest on the unavailability of a questionable species of testimony
18 Wis. STAT. §325.16 (1957). See also §325.17 as to transactions with a deceased
agent in which the principle involved is substantially the same as in §325.16.
29257 Wis. 528, 44 N.W. 2d 240 (1950).
20 Ibid, at 531.
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equally weak with that which is excluded !21 In addition, if the interest
element is removed from consideration of the fairness proposition, the
following conclusion results: If it is so unfair to allow damaging testi-
mony to be offered against the estate of a person who because of his
death is in no position to rebut, then the exclusion should extend as
well to a disinterested witness offering unfavorable testimony. No rule
of evidence, however, supports such a proposal. Further, no rule of
evidence requires exclusion of damaging testimony of either a disin-
terested or an interested witness simply because the other party is
unable to offer evidence in rebuttal, when such inability is due to any
other reason besides the death of his rebutting witness. Why make an
exception when the inability to rebut is due to the witness' death?
Separate consideration of the interest proposition and the fairness
proposition demonstrate their unsoundness as valid reasons for the
rule. Mix interest with inability to rebut due to death, however, and
the court finds a reaction producing exclusion. Nevertheless, on the
basis of its rationale, the rule should be condemned, and in fact, has
been soundly disapproved.
22
B. The Wisconsin Statutory Exclusion in Operation
Even if it can be assumed that the witness will be corrupted by his
interest and that it is unfair to let him testify since the deceased person
cannot rebut, the problem of framing a statutory exclusion which is
logically and practically sound is particularly acute. In addition, it is
impossible to demonstrate that the statute is fulfilling its supposed pur-
pose in any given instance, namely, protecting the estates of deceased
persons by testimonial trustworthiness of the witness. Each time the
statute is applied, there also looms the frightening possibility that a
clever perjurer is utilizing for his own ends, its non-application on the
basis of some technicality.
And it is a pity-perhaps if the theory of it is valid, the statute
is the best you can do-but it does seem a pity [that] such phil-
osophy, if it is right, has to be vindicated by a statute that offers
so many difficulties of construction.23
There are three areas in particular in which the achievement of just
results under the statute are undemonstrable.
1. When is a witness testifying in his own behalf or interest?
The statute begins by prohibiting the testimony of a witness when
it is offered in "his own behalf or interest." The statute does not state
explicitly when it is that a person is testifying in his own interest, and
21 2 GiORE, supra note 1, §578, at 696.
22 Ibid. at 697; See also The Report of the New York Commonwealth Fund
Committee entitled THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM
23-35 (1927).
23 \VICKHEi%'s LECTURES at 94.
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obviously the legislative process is clearly unsuited toward drawing a
clear cut line of delineation. In this area the distinctions of case-by-
case adjudication have made the law. The statute has been held to
apply generally to the testimony of persons interested in an estate which
is the subject of litigation in probate proceedings. For instance, a lega-
tee attempting to establish a last will cannot testify as to conversations
she had with the testatrix concerning the disposition of testatrix's pro-
perty in a manner favorable to the legatee.2" An heir who would bene-
fit by the revocation of a will cannot testify as to the revocation. 25 A
subscribing witness, who, if the alleged nuncupative will were proved,
would be the sole legatee, could not testify as to the act of the execu-
tion by the testatrix.2 6 Note here that in each of these cases the witness
not only had a direct legal interest in the outcome of the suit, but the
testimony obviously was in the witness' interest. However, where the
testimony is not in the witness' interest, it can go in. Therefore a sub-
scribing witness who was also the residuary legatee, was allowed to
testify as to the execution of the will by the testator, since as a result
of allowing her testimony in she lost her legacy by operation of the
statutes.
27
However, a problem now arises. How far out along the range of
small graduations of interest do you go to reach the point where the
prospects of potential perjury diminish to such a degree in the court's
opinion, that it will allow the testimony to come in? To illustrate: A
provision in a will appointing the attorney who drafted it as executor
and fixing his compensation at $200, which sum was small considering
the size of the estate, did not disqualify him from being a subscribing
24Goerke v. Goerke, 80 Wis. 516, 50 N.W. 345 (1891); Will of Pullen, 166 Wis.
254, 165 N.W. 25 (1917).
25 In re Valentine's Will, 93 Wis. 45, 67 N.W. 12 (1896).
26 Will of Repush, supra note 19.
27 Estate of Johnson, 170 Wis. 436, 175 N.W. 917 (1920). In the Johnson case
the court conqluded that even if the act of attesting the will were a transaction
with a deceased, nevertheless, it is saved from the statute by being a subject
of special consideration in the separate chapter on wills. §2282 of the Statutes
in effect when the will was executed required attestation and subscription by
at least two competent witnesses, (unless the will were nuncupative) for
validity. The argument that Mr. Hahn was an incompetent witness was re-
spected by the court by virtue of the fact that §2284 made gifts to a sub-
scribing witness void unless there were at least two other subscribing wit-
nesses. This showed the legislative intent only to void the gift but not at
the same time to make the witness incompetent, even though there was no
express provision in §2284 allowing in such testimony as there had been in
the predecessor section. However, in the Repush case, the court refused to
follow the rule in the Johnson case. The reason is not clear, but since ap-
parently, the will being nuncupative, the gift to the sole legatee who was also
a subscribing witness would not have been void by virtue of §238.08 which
validates gifts to subscribing witnesses of any will where there are at least
two other subscribing witnesses. In this case there were three. Therefore
had the court allowed Joe Repush to testify, the will would have been proved
under §238.16 and by virtue of §238.08, Joe would have also taken under the
will as sole legatee. Thus his testimony was offered in his own "behalf or
interest" whereas Mr. Hahn in the Johnson case was not so testifying.
1959]
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witness to the will.2" An executor who appears as a proponent of the
will in a contested probate proceeding, is a competent, witness, since
his compensation is a quid pro quo for services rendered, and he ap-
parently stands to gain or lose nothing whether the will is upheld or
not.29 A mother was competent to testify as to the making of a con-
tract with the deceased whereby he agreed to leave her child a legacy
if the deceased and his wife were allowed to bring up the child, since
the mother, having no legal duty (at that time) to support the child,
stood to gain nothing by the transaction. 3° The parents of a plaintiff
child in a malpractice action could testify as to conversations with the
doctor, since deceased, taking place during the course of treatment of
the child, since not being parties to the action or having any financial
or pecuniary interest in the result thereof, they were competent wit-
nesses.31 A plaintiff's wife was competent to testify to damaging state-
ments made by the defendant driver, since deceased, to her immediately
after the automobile collision, since she was neither a party to the action
nor would she secure any direct benefits therefrom. 32 An insurance
agent could testify that he agreed with the insured, now deceased, to
insure the barn that was not blown down by a windstorm, when the
issue was as to which of the two barns the policy covered, since he had
no legal interest in the outcome of the litigation. However, had the
suit been one for recission of the policy, then he would have been an
incompetent witness since he stood to lose his commission. 33 On the
other hand, the wife of an executor was not allowed to testify that a
testatrix made a gift of $1,500 to her and her husband jointly, since
she was testifying in her own interest. However, had she and her hus-
band taken the position that the alleged gift was to him alone, then
she would have been a competent witness. 3
... You can argue till the cows come home whether a particular
decision has properly construed the statute, but even if it has,
isn't it very frequently a question under this act as to whether
the statute properly construed may not draw a perfectly arbi-
trary line between things that may be let in and things that may
be left out, when this general principle covers one situation just
about as well as another ... 35
It apparently is well nigh on to impossible to determine whether the
above decisions correctly interpret the statute. By its broad termi-
28 Will of Henderson, 272 Wis. 163, 74 N.W. 739 (1956).
29 Anderson v. Laugen, 122 Wis. 57, 99 N.W. 437 (1904) ; Estate of Novak, 181
Wis. 16, 193 N.W. 1000 (1923); Will of Williams, 256 Wis. 338, 41 N.W.
2d 191 (1949).
30 Dilger v. Estate of McQuade, 158 Wis. 328, 148 N.W. 1085 (1914).
31 Nelson v. Ziegler, 196 Wis. 426, 220 N.W. 194 (1928).
32 Carlsen v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 255 Wis. 407, 39 N.W. 2d 442
(1949).
3 Nolan v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 243 Wis. 30, 9 N.W. 2d 74 (1943).
-3 Estate of Southward, 208 Wis. 150, 242 N.W. 584 (1932).
35 WICICHEm's LECTURES at 89.
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nology it leaves the determination of when a witness is testifying in
his own behalf or interest almost completely to the court's discretion.
The question is, then, to determine how the court is exercising that
discretion, with a view toward achieving a just result in the case at
hand, and setting a precedent for future similar fact situations. It is in
this light that the validity of the application or non-application of the
statute in a particular fact situation should be measured.
How does the court go about exercising its discretion? Take for
example the above situation where a mother was allowed to testify as
to the making of a contract with theh deceased wherein he promised
to leave a legacy to her daughter. Does the court feel that because of
the indirect nature of the mother's interest, here merely her affection
for her daughter and her desire to see her daughter obtain a windfall,
the chances are pretty good that she will tell the truth? That possibly
90 out of 100 mothers in a similar situation are testimonially trustworthy
and that therefore this particular mother can testify and a precedent
can be set? If so, this is a small consolation to the deceased, if in fact,
this mother is one of the 10 who would perjure themselves. Further,
the next nine mothers who come along may be clever perjurers who are
now allowed to testify because the rule now works in their favor. On
the other side of the coin, a sole legatee above could not testify as a
subscribing witness to the will because of his direct and large pecuniary
interest. On the basis of the above reasoning, the court apparently feels
the chances are pretty poor that he will tell the truth, say, only 50 out
of 100. Therefore this particular legatee cannot testify. This is a
small consolation to the legatee if he is in fact one of the 50 who will
tell the truth. Likewise it is of small consolation, once the precedent
has been set, to the next 49 legatees who come along assuming they are
the truthful ones. All this, of course, assumes a direct correlation
between the magnitude and directness of the interest, and the perver-
sity of human nature. Even if this highly questionable assumption
were valid, the injustice in such an approach is obvious. When it is
considered that the odds in favor of perjured testimony on the basis of
human experience are not in direct correlation with the magnitude of
the interest, in cases where the exclusion is applied, for example the
legatee situation above, the chances are that many more than 50 out of
100 honest witnesses will be deprived of the opportunity to tell the
truth, and injustice is thereby compounded.
However, there is one salvation. If in the fact, the court does not
determine the applicability of the rule primarily on the basis of its
idea of what the odds in the aggregate are in favor of perjured testi-
mony, but in addition passes unconscious judgment on the credibility
on this particular individual witness before making a decision as to
whether the rule should apply, then, at least, something approximating
19591
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
a logical and just result can be achieved in a particlar case, the first time
that type of fact situation arises. It seems likely that this is in fact
what the court actually does in the interest area of the statute. Justice
can then prevail, at least until the next time a fact situation on all fours
arises. Then, of course, a precedent based primarily on the credibility
of a particular witness in a prior case is valueless in a subsequent case
where the personal impression of the witness on the court may differ,
and insofar as the court would follow the precedent based on the doc-
trine of stare decisis alone, the door is opened to injustice.
2. What constitutes a transaction or communication with a Deceased
Person.
Once it has been determined that the testimony offered by the wit-
ness is in his own behalf or interest to a prohibited degree, the next
step is to determine whether the transaction with the deceased is of a
disqualifying kind. In Wisconsin, the transaction must be a "mutual
transaction" between the deceased and the witness who survives, in
which both the survivor as well as the deceased actively participated. 36
The words "by him personally" appearing in the statute immediately
following the words "transaction or communication" qualify the latter
words wherever they thereafter appear in the statute.37 The problem
here is to determine what constitutes the type of mutual or personal
transaction which falls within the prohibition of the statute. Like the
"interest" provision of the statute, the "transaction" provision is
phrased most generally, except as qualified by the word "personal." As
in the interest area, the distinctions of case-by-case adjudication have
made the law.
A party can testify as to the receipt of a letter from a person, since
deceased, since the receipt is not a transaction or communication
within the meaning of the statute which contemplates a face-to-face
transaction by the parties in the presence of each other.38 However,
this is providing he is able to produce the letter at the trial. If he cannot
produce it and claims it is lost, he cannot testify as to its contents since
the sending of the letter by the deceased and its receipt by the witness
then becomes a prohibited transaction or communication.39 The reason
given is that if the witness could testify, there would be no security
against his fraudulently claiming a lost letter. However, even where
the witness is able to produce the letter, where is the assurance that the
deceased party ever wrote it? The deceased person is not able to deny
writing it and it well may be that his estate will be despoiled through
36 Krantz v. Krantz, 211 Wis. 249, 248 N.W. 155 (1933).
_ 7Pick Foundry Inc. v. General Door Mfg. Co., 262 Wis. 311, 55 N.W. 2d 407
(1952).38 Daniels v. Foster, 26 Wis. 686 (1870) ; See also Estate of Menzer, 189 Wis.
340, 207 N.W. 703 (1926).
39 Felz v. Estate of Felz, 170 Wis. 550, 174 N.W. 908 (1920).
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the medium of a clever forgery. Is the real distinction between these
two cases the fact that the court felt that in one the witness was credible
and in the other he was not? Otherwise, how can it be said that there
really is a distinction here; that the non-availability of a letter at the
time of trial alters the nature of a prior transaction from one that is not
personal to one that is?
A wife could not testify as to her possession of a bankbook where the
issue was whether or not her husband, since deceased, had made her a
gift of the account. Since she would have been incompetent to testify
to his act of delivery to her, she was also incompetent to testify to the
fact of her possession from which delivery by her husband could be
inferred.40 However, a father could testify that the keys to a joint safe
deposit box leased in his and the son's names had never been in the
son's possession, in order to establish that the contents of the box had
never been delivered to the son.41 The distinction between the two
cases apparently is that if the deceased ever had possession at one time,
then allowing in testimony as to the survivor's testimony raises an in-
ference of delivery. However if the deceased never had possession,
then testimony as to the survivor's possession negatives any inference
of a transaction involving delivery. However, the question is whether
such a distinction is really consistent with the purpose of the rule.
Why forbid testimony of a personal transaction in one case which in
effect is no more damaging to the estate than testimony concerning the
non-existence of a personal transaction in the other? In one case the
witness affirms a transaction with the dec~ased, in the other he denies
it. In either case his interest supposedly makes him prone to perjury
and the deceased person cannot rebut him. Or was this another credi-
bility-of-the-witness distinction?
The cases appear to be unanimously in favor of allowing a claimant
to testify to the nature of the services he rendered the deceased and
their value.42 The rationale is that the witness is testifying to the inde-
pendent fact of what he did and not to the making of a contract with
the deceased which would be a prohibited transaction or communication.
However, a mortgagor cannot testify as to his act of payment to the
mortgagee, now deceased.43 In either situation however, the witness
only wants to testify as to what he did, yet in one situation he is com-
petent; in the other he is not."4
40 Estate of Krause, 241 Wis. 41,4 N.W. 2d 122 (1942).41 McComb v. McComb, 204 Wis. 293, 234 N.W. 707 (1931).
42 Pritchard v. Pritchard, 69 Wis. 373, 34 N.W. 506 (1887); Belden v. Scott 65
Wis. 425, 27 N.W. 356 (1886) ; In re Kessler's Estate, 87 Wis. 660, 59 N.W.
129 (1894); Bossi's Estate v. Baehr, 133 Wis. 119, 113 N.W. 433 (1907);
Gardner v. Young's Estate, 163 Wis. 241, 157 N.W. 787 (1916) ; In re Fuller's
Will, 190 Wis. 445, 209 N.W. 683 (1926); Kirkpatrick v. Milks, 257 Wis.
549,44 N.W. 2d 574 (1950).
3 Jackson v. Inman, 137 Wis. 20, 118 N.W. 189 (1908).
"See WICKHEM's LEcTuREs at 92 and 93.
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An injured pedestrian could not testify that she called out to a
truckdriver, since deceased, to wait while she passed in front of the
truck, but instead the truck started up suddenly and injured her.45 A
plaintiff guest injured in an automobile accident could not testify that
she protested to her host that he was driving too fast in an action
against his estate where her assumption of risk was at issue.46 However
in an action against a deceased's estate arising out of another automo-
bile collision, the injured plaintiff was allowed to testify concerning
the movements of the automobile driven by the deceased driver.4 7
... We think the transaction meant in Sec. 325.16 is a personal
transaction with a deceased, a transaction in which each is an
active participant, and that it does not prevent the survivor from
describing an event or physical situation, or the movements or
actions of a deceased person quite independent and apart and in
no way connected with or prompted or influenced by reason of
the conduct of the party testifying. The transaction mentioned in
Sec. 325.16 means a mutual transaction between the deceased
and the surviving party, one in which they both actively partici-
pated... 4 "
On this theory an injured guest was allowed to testify in an action
against the estate of his deceased host in the negligent operation of the
host's automobile, as to his observations, description of the physical
situation and the driver's movements and actions in operating and con-
trolling the automobile. 49 A mere bystander who does not participate
in or influence a transaction between the deceased and a third party can
testify to it, even though he is interested in the outcome of the suit."
Who can say whether these decisions and the distinctions they draw
correctly interpret the statute. As in the interest area, it will be as-
sumed that they do correctly interpret it. Nevertheless, do these deci-
sions and the distinctions they draw, even if correct, demonstrate that
the statute succeeds in its purpose? Are the estates of deceased persons
really protected from perjury by letting the survivor to the transaction
testify as to what he or the deceased said? Is it consistent to allow the
interested bystander to testify as to what the deceased said or did
simply because the bystander did not enter into the transaction actively
or influence it? It seems that in any case the inclination towards perjury
should still be there assuming the validity of the interest rationale and
the fact that the deceased is not available to rebut the survivor's testi-
mony. On the other hand where the testimony was prohibited, we are
still haunted with the spectre of the frustrated claimant.
45 Jackonska-Peterson v. D. Rick & Sons Co., 240 Wis. 197, 2 N.W. 2d 873 (1942).
46 Waters v. Markham, 204 Wis. 249, 235 N.W. 797 (1931).
47 Seligman v. Hammond, 205 Wis. 199, 236 N.W. 115 (1931).
48 Ibid, at 206.
49 Krantz v. Krantz, supra note 36.
50 In re Laugen's Will, 122 Wis. 57, 99 N.W. 437 (1904) ; Flanagan v. Flanagan's
Estate, 169 Wis. 537, 173 N.W. 297 (1919).
[Vol. 43
1959] COMMENTS
3. What is the effect where the opposite party does not derive his
claim or sustain his liability through the deceased?
A party or other interested witness cannot testify as to a personal
transaction with a deceased person where the opposite party derives his
title or sustains his liability under the deceased, as for example, where
he is the administrator of the deceased's estate. However, absent this
element and the disqualification evaporates. Although it appears that
in this area it should be relatively easy to determine when the opposite
party in fact derives his interest under the deceased, there has been a
problem of interpretation. Even where there is no problem of interpre-
tation, the results reached considering the type of thinking which
prompted the statute in the first place are inconsistent with that think-
ing.
In an action involving suit by a wife against her son and his insurer
for the wrongful death of her husband resulting from the son's negli-
gent operation of the automobile in which his father was riding as a
guest passenger, the son's defense was that his father assumed the risk.
The son was competent to testify that when he cut out to pass another
car on a hill, his father made no protest or outcry.51 The reason given
for the competency of the son's testimony was that the opposite party,
the wife, did not derive her cause of action through the deceased, who
has no cause of action for his own death, but rather, under the wrong-
ful death statute,52 which creates and vests in her personally a cause of
action and does not devolve a cause of action on the deceased and
thence through him to her. It is not debatable that such is a proper
interpretation of the devolution of her cause of action. However, from-
the standpoint of what the testimony concerned, how does this situation
differ essentially from the one where the injured guest was prohibited
from testifying that she protested the rate of speed at which her de-
ceased host was driving ?5 It is true that in that situation her testimony
was directed against the estate of a deceased person and therefore flew
directly into the teeth of the statute. Here there is no danger of spoila-
tion of a decedent's estate. Whether the wife wins or loses is imma-
terial to the decedent's estate which has no claim to the cause of action.
Nevertheless, assuming that witnesses are prone to perjury because
interested and because the decedent cannot rebut, there is still the
probability of perjury. This time, however, potential perjury can be
used to defeat an honest claim. Since the witness can testify, the statute
which supposedly was designed to eliminate the possibility of spoilation
of the estates of deceased persons now becomes an instrument which
allows in testimony, the veracity of which is highly doubtful, assuming
our twin rationale to be true, simply because it is not levelled directly
51 Olsen v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 252 Wis. 37, 30 N.W. 2d 196 (1947).
52 WIs. STATS. §§331.03 and 331.04 (1957).
53 Waters v. Markham, supra note 46.
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against the estate of a deceased person. It seems that in the sense that a
potentially just claim on the part of the wife is being jeopardized by
the fact that the deceased is not able to rebut or modify the defendant's
testimony pertaining to the deceased's assumption of risk, the statute
operates inconsistently considering its rationale. In logic and fairness,
why should the statutes operate to protect a decedent's estate from
spoilation by excluding certain testimony, when testimony o the exact
same nature and from a similar source is allowed in to operate against
the claim of a living person who takes exactly the same risk that the
witness is committing perjury.
A wife could testify as to a conversation between her deceased
husband and an insurance agent relative to the making of a contract
of insurance naming her as beneficiary, where the company denied the
policy was in effect when her husband died. The reason given is that
the opposite party, the company, does not derive its liability through the
deceased, but through its contract with him. 4 In an action under the
workman's compensation statutes by a wife for the death of her hus-
band, the secretary of the company in which the husband was doing
some work was competent to testify as to conversations with the de-
ceased indicating that he was in fact an independent contractor and not
an employee, which of course meant the widow would have no statutory
claim. The secretary could testify because the opposite party, the wife,
derived her cause of action under the statute and not through the
deceased. 5  However, a husband was not allowed to testify that he and
his wife agreed that a joint bank account in both their names was
erected solely for his convenience and that she was not allowed to have
any interest therein.56 The state of Wisconsin was attempting to levy
an inheritance tax on the wife's half and the husband argued that the
state did not claim through the deceased, but under its power to tax
derived from the inheritance tax statutes, and that therefore he was a
competent witness. The court rejected this argument, however, dis-
tinguishing the situation from one under the Workman's compensation
statutes. The court felt that here the wife in reality had such an interest
in the subject matter of the controversy that she could have sued during
her lifetime, since what the husband was actually doing here was
attempting to reform the evidence of title to the account. Therefore
the state, in effect, stood in her place and derived its claim through
her.5 7 The husband then ultimately was disqualified because his testi-
mony, in this technical sense, was directed against the estate of a dece-
dent.
54Chamberlain v. Prudential Ins. Co., 109 Wis. 4, 85 N.W. 128 (1901).
55J. Romberger Co. v. Industrial Commission, 234 Wis. 236, 290 N.W. 639
(1940).
56 In re Hounsell's Estate, 252 Wis. 138, 31 N.W. 2d 203 (1947).
57 But see Justice Currie's comment on this analysis in Currie, Transactions
with a Deceased Person, 1948 Wis. L. REv. 491, at 502.
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Is this situation really distinguishable from one involving a claim
under the workman's compensation statute? A joint tenant has a
property interest in the subject matter of the joint tenancy only while
alive. After his death his interest passes to the other joint tenant by
right of survivorship so for all practical purposes it shouldn't make
any difference to the estate of the decedent whether the survivor now
attempts to reform the title or not, since the survivor has undisputed
title, whether as surviving joint tenant or as sole owner originally. On
the other hand the state does not acquire an interest in the subject
matter under the inheritance tax statutes until the death of the joint
tenant. It comes into the picture at the exact moment that it becomes
completely immaterial to the deceased whether the survivor attempts to
reform the evidence of title or not. In this sense can it be said that the
state stands in the place of the deceased and derives its claim through
her? Or did'the court once again, strain to find a distinction because of
its impression of the credibility of the witness, in this case, an unfavor-
able impression.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is submitted that this last relic of the old common law disqualifi-
cation by interest rule as expressed in Wisconsin Statutes Secs. 325.16
and .17 be abolished. The statutes appear to show legislative dissatisfac-
tion with the old disqualification rule but are an attempt to compromise
without doing away with the rule altogether. However, the dead man's
exception to the abolition of the disqualification because of interest
rule appears to be unsound, both as to the interest and the fairness
propositions upon which it rests. Even assuming the theory of the rule
has some validity, it cannot be demonstrated that the statutes as they
now exist bear a reasonable relationship to the production of just re-
sults, and that in the last analysis it appears that the credibility of the
particular witness influences the court to a large degree in determining
whether or not his testimony fits within the statute. It is recommended
therefore that legislation along the lines of the following statute, which
was recommended on February 22, 1940, by the State Bar Association,
be adopted:
No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any action,
suit, or proceeding, by reason of his interest in the event of same
as a party or otherwise.
In actions, suits or proceedings by or against the representa-
tives of deceased persons, including proceedings for the probate
of wills, any statement of the deceased, whether oral or written,
shall not be excluded as hearsay provided the trial judge shall
first find as a fact that the statement was made by the decedent,
and that it was made in good faith and on the decedent's per-
sonal knowledge.58
58 See Justice Currie's approval of the proposed legislation. Id. at 506; See also
Justice Wickhem's comment in WICKHEM's LECTURES 95-98.
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In effect, legislation of this type would formally codify the actual
practice of the courts as it now exists. The trial judge, who is most
competent to do so, would pass on the credibility and other corroborating
evidence, and if he were satisfied that the deceased person actually
made the statement, the testimony of the witness could go into evi-
dence and the trier of fact could place whatever weight it wanted on
the testimony, taking into account the witness' interest. This appears
to be a more straightforward system than paying lip service to the arti-
ficial provisions of the existing statute with the resultant series of
sometimes incomprehensible distinctions, which become comprehensible
only if it is realized that the courts are in effect allowing their impres-
sion of the witness' credibility to effect their determinations as to
whether the rule should apply in any given instance.
In addition, to prevent such legislation from becoming an instru-
ment for perjury in the hands of an unscrupulous few, it might be
prudential to require corroborating evidence in addition to the testi-
mony of the survivor as a prerequisite for recovery. Several states
have enacted statutes which so require.59 However, Wigmore feels
that such statutes represent only a half-way measure based on the same
rationale as the statutes which exclude the survivors' testimony alto-
gether. 0 Where, in fact, there is corroborating evidence, there would
be no problem. However, in the case where the survivor and the de-
cedent were the only witnesses to the transaction, such a requirement
appears to be open to the same objection levelled against total dis-
qualification of the survivors' testimony. Whether or not the legisla-
ture would see fit to impose such a requirement will depend on its best
estimate of the goodness or perversity of human nature. Such an ap-
proach, however, at the very least, creates a common meeting ground
with those who are convinced that the rationale of the rule of total
exclusion is sound, and might well open the door to a more enlightened
rule than that which exists in Wisconsin today.
BERNARD P. BERRY
59 See 7 WAlIGMORE, supra note 1, §2065 n. 5 where the statutes are collected.
60 Id. at 374-375.
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